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INTRODUCTION
United States prisons commonly shackle and chain pregnant inmates to a
hospital bed during childbirth.1 This practice violates the U.S. Constitution
as well as internationally recognized standards of human rights. Prisons
are obligated to provide for prisoners’ health and medical treatment under
*
J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 2007. The author practices business
litigation in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
1. See, e.g., Julie B. Ehrlich & Lynn M. Paltrow, Jailing Pregnant Women Raises
Health Risks, WOMEN’S ENEWS, Sept. 9, 2006, http://www.womensenews.org/article
.cfm/dyn/aid/2894 (last visited Nov. 3, 2007).
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the Constitution’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment as well as under international human rights law.2
International law provides for broad protections for women throughout
pregnancy and delivery, the rights to the highest attainable standard of
health, the right to security of person, and the right to be free from torture
and inhumane or degrading treatment, all of which are violated by this
practice.3 In fact, the Committee on Torture, the enforcement body to the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, has explicitly informed the U.S. that its prisons
are violating women’s human rights by shackling pregnant inmates during
childbirth. The country’s various legislative bodies should look to
international human rights as an indication of how American law should
protect its pregnant prisoners. United States federal and state prisons,
departments of corrections, and state legislatures should prohibit this
inhumane and dehumanizing treatment of female prisoners, and bring the
country in line with both its constitutional and international obligations to
the pregnant prison population.
BACKGROUND
I. Where and How Shackling Is Happening
The vast majority of states remain silent on the practice of shackling
pregnant inmates during childbirth. Forty-eight out of fifty states lack
legislation that protects imprisoned pregnant women.4 While in labor,
incarcerated women are typically shackled or chained to the hospital bed,
by the ankle, wrist, or both.5 Warnice Robinson, an inmate convicted of
shoplifting in Illinois, a state that has since prohibited the shackling of
pregnant inmates during childbirth, told Amnesty International USA
(“Amnesty”) that

2. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
3. See U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,

General Recommendation 24, Women and Health (Twentieth Session, 1999), U.N.
Doc. A/54/38 at 5 (1999), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, ¶ 27, U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN/1/REV.6 at 271 (2003), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts
/gencomm/gener124/htm [hereinafter CEDAW] (articulating that women’s unique
biological needs require them to have greater medical protection than men).
4. Amnesty Int’l, Abuse of Women in Custody: Sexual Misconduct and Shackling
of Pregnant Women, http://www.amnestyusa.org/women/custody/keyfindings_
restraints.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2007) [hereinafter Amnesty Int’l, Abuse of Women
in Custody] (listing Illinois and California as the only two states that have legislation
regulating the restraint of pregnant women in prison).
5. See id. (stating that women are often restrained without regard to whether they
have a history of violence).
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[g]iving birth while incarcerated was one of the most horrifying
experiences of my life. At the hospital I was shackled to a metal bed
post by my right ankle throughout seven hours of labor, although a
correctional officer was in the room with me at all times . . . . Imagine
being shackled to a metal bedpost, excruciating pains going through my
body, and not being able to adjust myself to even try to feel any type of
comfort, trying to move and with each turn having hard, cold metal
restraining my movements.6

Another inmate, Maria Jones, told Amnesty that
[b]ecause I was shackled to the bed, they couldn’t remove the lower part
of the bed for the delivery, and they couldn’t put my feet in the stirrups.
My feet were still shackled together, and I couldn’t get my legs apart.
The doctor called for the officer, but the officer had gone down the hall.
No one else could unlock the shackles, and my baby was coming but I
couldn’t open my legs.7

Similarly, Samantha Luther, an inmate in Wisconsin, was forced to give
birth while her ankles were shackled approximately eighteen inches apart. 8
Her shackles were not removed until just before the actual birth.9
Samantha described that “[i]t was so humiliating. My ankles were raw.”10
Due to the lack of legislative and regulatory protection for pregnant female
prisoners in the United States, these stories, unfortunately, are quite
common.
Not only do the vast majority of states lack legislation on this prison
practice, twenty-three state corrections departments and the Federal Bureau
of Prisons expressly allow the use of restraints on pregnant inmates during
childbirth.11 Amnesty reported that in Alabama, “often two extremities are
restrained.”12 In Louisiana, Amnesty found that the state permits the use of
leg irons, while the state of Nevada typically employs only wrist restraints,
and New Hampshire allows “one foot to be shackled to the bed during
labor.”13 Women in Michigan told Amnesty in 1998 “that they were
6. Amnesty Int’l, Not Part of My Sentence: Violations of the Human Rights of
Women in Custody, Section IV: Restraints, http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/
women/report5.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2007) [hereinafter Amnesty Int’l, Not Part
of My Sentence].
7. Id.
8. See Amnesty Int’l, Abuse of Women in Custody, supra note 4 (noting that
although Samantha remained shackled, she was required to pace in order to induce
labor).
9. See id. (explaining that the shackles were finally removed right before the
actual birth so that Samantha could push).
10. Id.
11. See id. (noting that state policies vary on when, during labor, a woman may be
shackled and in what manner).
12. Id.
13. Amnesty Int’l, Abuse of Women in Custody, supra note 4.
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transported to the hospital secured by belly chains and handcuffs, and were
kept in restraints at the hospital even though they were constantly
supervised by prison guards.”14 “Jails and prisons use restraints on women
as a matter of course, regardless of whether a woman has a history of
violence (which only a minority have); regardless of whether she has ever
absconded or attempted to escape (which few women have) . . . .” and
regardless of whether a guard is present.15 In addition to shackling,
Amnesty reports that “[t]wenty-four state departments of corrections
station an officer in the delivery room while an inmate is in labor.”16
II. Effects of Shackling on Women’s Physical and Mental Health
Amnesty International USA and the American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists (“ACOG”) have reported that shackling poses health
risks to both the woman and her baby.17 The ACOG has expressed its view
that
[p]hysical restraints have interfered with the ability of physicians to
safely practice medicine by reducing their ability to assess and evaluate
the physical condition of the mother and the fetus, and have similarly
made the labor and delivery process more difficult than it needs to be;
thus, overall putting the health and lives of the women and unborn
children at risk.18

According to Amnesty, women undergoing childbirth need to be “mobile
so that they can assume various positions as needed,” and women’s
mobility is greatly limited and sometimes altogether prevented due to
shackling.19 Additionally, because of the relatively common need for
emergency cesareans (“C-sections”), shackling women poses additional
risks because “[i]f there were a need for a C-Section, the mother needs to
be moved to an operating room immediately and a delay of even five
minutes could result in permanent brain damage for the baby.”20 Maria
Jones’s experience, detailed above, demonstrates the reality of potential
delays in removing the shackles and the call for concern posed by any such

14. Amnesty Int’l, Not Part of My Sentence, supra note 6.
15. See id. (noting that exceptions may be made for certain medical conditions);

see also CYNDI BANKS, WOMEN IN PRISON: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 87 (ABC-CLIO
2003).
16. Amnesty Int’l, Abuse of Women in Custody, supra note 4.
17. See id.
18. Governor Signs Bill to End Shackling of Women During Labor and Delivery,
MED. NEWS TODAY, Oct. 10, 2005, http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/medical
news.php?newsid=31786 (last visited Nov. 5, 2007).
19. Amnesty Int’l, Abuse of Women in Custody, supra note 4.
20. Id.
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delays.21 Similar to the concerns expressed by ACOG, Amnesty reports
that “[h]aving the woman in shackles compromises the ability to
manipulate her legs into the proper position for treatment,” thereby
reducing the doctor’s ability to carefully treat the patient.22 Furthermore,
“[p]regnant women in their third trimesters may already have balance
problems; shackling their legs heightens the risk that the women will fall,
potentially injuring them and their fetuses.”23 Finally, “[t]he mother and
baby’s health could be compromised if there were complications during
delivery such as hemorrhage or decrease in fetal heart beat,” in which case
immediate removal of the shackles would be required and delays could
cause further complications.24 In addition to causing mental distress and
humiliation to incarcerated women, shackling poses significant physical
health risks that the government could eliminate by providing prison guard
supervision of inmates, rather than shackling.25
III. Shackling Affects a Significant Number of American Women Each Year
In 1999, the U.S. Department of Justice reported that women only
account for approximately sixteen percent of the “total corrections
population,” however, this number is consistently rising, causing the
number of women affected by the common prison practice of shackling
during childbirth to grow.26 Approximately six percent of women, on
average, are pregnant when admitted to local jails, and approximately five
percent of women, on average, are pregnant when admitted to state
prisons.27 The Sentencing Project, a nonprofit organization dedicated to
studying criminal justice policy and data,28 “estimates that 40,000 women
are admitted to the nation’s prisons each year, suggesting that 2,000 babies

21. See Amnesty Int’l, Not Part of My Sentence, supra note 6 (explaining that even
though the state never charged Maria Jones with a violent crime, she was shackled
during childbirth and this caused complications with her delivery).
22. Id.
23. See Ehrlich & Paltrow, supra note 1 (lamenting that shackling incarcerated
women throughout pregnancy and during their delivery is a national norm).
24. Amnesty Int’l, Abuse of Women in Custody, supra note 4.
25. See Amnesty Int’l, Not Part of My Sentence, supra note 6 (advocating for
restraints only to be used to prevent an inmate from escaping or hurting herself or
others).
26. See LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD & TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
WOMEN OFFENDERS (2000) (noting that in 1999 women comprised eight percent of
convicted violent felons, twenty-three percent of property felons and seventeen percent
of drug felons).
27. See id. at 8 (elaborating that three percent of women received prenatal care
while in local jails and four percent of women received prenatal care in state prison).
28. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, WOMEN IN PRISON (2006), http://www.sentencing
project.org/pdfs/1032.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2007) [hereinafter WOMEN IN PRISON].
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are born to American prisoners annually,”29 and due to the continual
increase in female inmates, this number is on the rise.
Female offenders are much less likely to be violent offenders.30 Women
only account for approximately fourteen percent of violent offenses, and
“three out of four violent female offenders committed simple assault,”31
demonstrating that even when females are convicted of violent crimes, they
are rarely convicted of the more violent crimes such as assault with a
deadly weapon, attempted murder, and murder. The Sentencing Project
reported that “[w]omen in state prisons in 2002 were . . . less likely than
men to be incarcerated for violent offenses” and that thirty-two percent of
convicted female offenders were convicted of violent offenses, compared
with fifty-two percent of their male counterparts.32
IV. Legislative Efforts to Ban Shackling in California, Illinois, and New
York
Recently, California, Illinois, and New York have taken the lead in
passing statewide legislation to eliminate the common prison practice of
shackling women during childbirth. California’s legislation, which went
into effect in January of 2006, states that a pregnant “inmate shall not be
shackled by the wrists, ankles, or both during labor, including during
transport to a hospital, during delivery, and while in recovery after giving
birth . . . .”33 Similarly, Illinois’s legislation, which went into effect in
January of 2000, states that
no handcuffs, shackles, or restraints of any kind may be used during her
transport to a medical facility for the purpose of delivering her baby.
Under no circumstance may leg irons or shackles or waist shackles be
used on any pregnant female prisoner who is in labor. Upon the
pregnant female prisoner’s entry to the hospital delivery room, a county
correctional officer must be posted immediately outside the delivery
room.34

29. See Adam Liptak, Prisons Often Shackle Pregnant Inmates in Labor, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 2, 2006, at A16 (explaining that most states restrain women during labor).
30. See WOMEN IN PRISON, supra note 28 (noting that thirty-five percent of women
are incarcerated for violent offenses, whereas fifty-three percent of men are
incarcerated for violent crimes).
31. See GREENFELD & SNELL, supra note 26, at 1 (stating that males commit
violent offenses at a per capita rate six times more than females).
32. See WOMEN IN PRISON, supra note 28 (finding that although women are less
likely to be incarcerated for a violent offense, the overall number of incarcerated
women has increased at double the rate of men since 1980).
33. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3423 (West 2006) (requiring that the prison board
provide means for care to children born to incarcerated mothers).
34. See 55 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-15003.6 (2000).
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Additionally, New York has a pending bill that would provide protection
for pregnant prisoners.35 It states,
No restraints of any kind shall be used during transport, except where the
officer in charge of the institution has determined that such a woman
presents a substantial flight risk, such woman may be handcuffed. Under
no circumstances shall restraints of any kind be used on any pregnant
woman who is in labor. Any such personnel as may be necessary to
supervise the woman to and from the hospital and during her stay at the
hospital shall be provided to ensure adequate care, custody and control
over the woman.36

An additional five states, Connecticut, Florida, Rhode Island,
Washington, and Wyoming prohibit the practice through state department
of corrections regulation.37 Despite the progress of these states, the Federal
Bureau of Prisons has failed to promulgate any regulations on the shackling
of pregnant inmates during childbirth, most states continue to ignore the
problem, and many states retain provisions allowing the practice.38
Amnesty has made the following recommendation to correct this
problem in American prisons:
the Federal Bureau of Prisons (FOB) and State Legislatures develop laws
to ban shackling of pregnant inmates, and that the FOB and Departments
of Corrections, prisons and jails adopt policies on the use of restraints in
accordance with the following:
• Restraints should be used only when they are required as a precaution
against escape or to prevent an inmate from injuring herself or other
people or damaging property. In every case, due regard must be given to
an inmate’s individual history.
• Policies should prohibit the use of restraints on pregnant women when
they are being transported and when they are in hospital awaiting birth,
and after they have just given birth.39

California’s legislation, which states that a pregnant “inmate shall not be
shackled by the wrists, ankles, or both during labor, including during
transport to a hospital, during delivery, and while in recovery after giving
birth,”40 is an example of the type of legislation that fits Amnesty’s
suggestions. California’s legislation is a broad prohibition on the use of
35. See A. 4105, 2007-2008 S. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2007).
36. Id.
37. See Amnesty Int’l, Abuse of Women in Custody, supra note 4 (elaborating that

Hawaii, Iowa, and Kansas have no written policy, but that the state correctional
practice is to not shackle women during childbirth).
38. See id. (observing that most states did not provide Amnesty with details about
the form of restraints used during delivery, nor did states provide Amnesty with a copy
of their restraint policy).
39. Id.
40. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3423 (West 2006).
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restraints on pregnant inmates during transport to the hospital, labor,
delivery, and recovery, allowing no exceptions.41 California’s legislation is
more protective than that suggested by Amnesty because Amnesty’s
suggestion allows for exceptions to its prohibition on the use of restraints
“as a precaution against escape” and to prevent injury to the inmate, others,
or property. 42
Conversely, the Illinois legislation prohibits the use of restraints during
transport to the hospital and during labor, but leaves the recovery period
unaddressed, which may be inconsistent with Amnesty’s recommendation
that the state prohibit the use of restraints after the woman has “just given
birth.”43 Similar to California, the Illinois law does not contain any
exceptions to its prohibition on the use of restraints.44 The Illinois law
ensures for security and prevention of escape by mandating that a prison
official be stationed “immediately outside the delivery room.”45
The pending New York bill mandates that no restraints be used during
transport to the hospital, with the exception of a woman who presents a
“substantial flight risk,” in which case handcuffs are permitted.46 This
exception is acceptable under Amnesty’s suggestions because Amnesty
allows the use of restraints only as a “precaution against escape” or to
prevent injury.47 In addition, the New York bill prohibits the use of any
restraints during labor; however, like the Illinois law, the New York bill
leaves the use of restraints during recovery unaddressed, causing it to
possibly be inconsistent with the Amnesty suggestions.48 Lastly, the New
York bill, provides for, but does not require, prison personnel to
accompany the woman and remain with her at the hospital in order “to
ensure adequate care, custody and control over the woman.”49 Where the
Illinois legislation requires this supervision, the New York bill simply
41. Id.
42. See Amnesty Int’l, Abuse of Women in Custody, supra note 4 (advocating that

the state should evaluate the needs of each individual prisoner when determining
whether shackling during childbirth is necessary).
43. 55 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-15003.6 (2000).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. A. 4105, 2007-2008 S. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2007).
47. See Amnesty Int’l, Not Part of My Sentence, supra note 6 (noting that the state
may allow the use of chains or irons when ordered by a medical officer, or to prevent a
prisoner from injuring herself or others).
48. Compare A. 4105, 2007-2008 S. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2007) (allowing for
the elimination of shackling during transportation and labor, but failing to address postdelivery recovery), and 55 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-15003.6 (2000) (forbidding shackles
during labor, but not afterwards), with Amnesty Int’l, Not Part of My Sentence, supra
note 6 (recommending that the state not shackle or chain women who have just given
birth).
49. A. 4105, 2007-2008 S. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2007).
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provides for it.
The California and Illinois laws are the most protective of inmates who
experience childbirth while incarcerated because they do not include any
exceptions, while the New York bill contains an exception for a
“substantial flight risk.”50 The California law is the only one that expressly
extends these protections throughout the recovery period.51 Both the
Illinois legislation and the New York legislation, however, address the
concerns of security and flight risk and alleviate these concerns by
providing for supervision of the inmate during transport to the hospital and
during her stay there. In balancing between the concerns for the women
experiencing childbirth while incarcerated and the need for security and
prevention of escape, it seems that a combination of the California law and
the Illinois law provides the best solution. By combining these two laws, a
state could broadly prohibit the use of restraints on pregnant women during
transport to the hospital, labor, delivery, and recovery, with no exceptions,
as well as provide mandatory supervision of the woman throughout this
process by the stationing of a guard immediately outside the hospital room.
In this manner, the states could eliminate the health concerns posed by
shackling, yet still prevent escape and injury by supervising inmates during
childbirth.
ANALYSIS
I. Shackling Violates the U.S. Constitution
“Prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the
protections of the Constitution.”52
Rather, inmates maintain their
constitutional rights as long as such rights are consistent with their status as
an inmate.53 According to both Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and U.S.
Supreme Court case law dealing with the constitutionality of prison
regulations, policies permitting the shackling of pregnant inmates during
childbirth are likely violating the United States Constitution.
In contrast to the minimal state law regulating the treatment of
incarcerated women during childbirth, there is currently no federal law
aimed at protecting pregnant women in prison. Nonetheless, this issue falls
50. Compare A. 4105, 2007-2008 S. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2007) (providing
that an officer in charge of the institution may determine whether a women poses a
flight risk and needs to be handcuffed during transportation), with 55 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/3-15003 (mandating that no handcuffs, shackles, or restraints of any kind be used
when transporting a pregnant inmate to a hospital).
51. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3423 (West 2006).
52. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987).
53. See id. at 95 (holding that these rights are curbed by legitimate penological
objectives, such as deterrence of crime, rehabilitation, and internal security and order).
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under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.54 Under
the Eighth Amendment, “cruel and unusual punishments [shall not be]
inflicted.”55 The U.S. Supreme Court held, in Estelle v. Gamble, that:
[T]he government [has an] obligation to provide medical care for those
whom it is punishing by incarceration. An inmate must rely on prison
authorities to treat his medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those
needs will not be met . . . . [D]enial of medical care may result in pain
and suffering which no one suggests would serve any penological
purpose.
...
We therefore conclude that deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs of prisoners constitutes the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain,” proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.56

Under Estelle, pregnant prisoners are entitled to medical care related to
their pregnancies.57 The Court further explained that, “[i]n order to state a
cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently
harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.”58
The act of chaining pregnant inmates to hospital beds could constitute
deliberate indifference to the prisoners’ medical needs because restricting a
woman’s movement while she is in labor exacerbates the pain and distress
associated with the birthing process and may lead to complications that
pose serious risks to the lives and health of both the mother and her baby.59
Although the existence of the right to medical treatment while in prison
has been established, the common practice of shackling women to the
hospital bed while in labor has not been specifically challenged.60 In
Turner v. Safley, the U.S. Supreme Court held that prison regulations are
subject to a “reasonableness test.”61 In Turner, the Court considered the
54. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
55. Id.
56. See 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976) (remanding the case to the lower court to

determine whether the plaintiff, who had incurred an injury while working at his
assigned prison job, had a cause of action against the Director of the Department of
Corrections for denying or delaying the plaintiff’s medical care).
57. See id. at 104 (holding that serious medical needs of prisoners cannot be
ignored under the Eighth Amendment).
58. See id. at 106.
59. See Amnesty Int’l, Abuse of Women in Custody, supra note 4 (noting that
women in labor need to be readily mobile so as to move into position quickly for
emergency treatment).
60. See id. (indicating that while Illinois and California have recognized that
shackles should not be used during labor and delivery, the other forty-eight states, the
District of Columbia, and the Federal Bureau of Prisons have no codified laws
restricting the routine use of shackles).
61. 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (“[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates’
constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests.”).
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constitutionality of two prison regulations promulgated by the Missouri
Division of Corrections, one regulated inmate marriage, the other regulated
“inmate-to-inmate correspondence.”62 In making this determination, the
Court set the standard for reviewing prison regulations and the factors
relevant in making this determination:63 when determining the
constitutionality of prison regulations, the relevant test is “whether a prison
regulation that burdens fundamental rights is ‘reasonably related’ to
legitimate penological objectives, or whether it represents an ‘exaggerated
response’ to those concerns.”64 In applying this test in Turner, the court
listed four factors as “relevant in determining the reasonableness of the
regulation at issue.”65
First, there must be a ‘valid, rational connection’ between the prison
regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify
it. Thus, a regulation cannot be sustained where the logical connection
between the regulation and the asserted goal is so remote as to render the
policy arbitrary or irrational.66

The second factor is “whether there are alternative means of exercising
the right that remain open to prison inmates.”67 The third factor is “the
impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on
guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources
generally.”68
Finally, the fourth factor is “the absence of ready
alternatives,” and “the existence of obvious, easy alternatives may be
evidence that the regulation is not reasonable, but is an ‘exaggerated
response’ to prison concerns.”69
In applying the Turner reasonableness test to the two Missouri
regulations at issue, the Supreme Court found that the prison regulation
dealing with correspondence between inmates was “promulgated for
security reasons” and that because of the growing prison gang problem,
“mail between [prison] institutions can be used to communicate escape
plans and to arrange assaults and other violent acts.”70 Consequently, the
62. See id. at 81 (upholding the regulation of inmate-to-inmate correspondence, but
invalidating the marriage restrictions because it was unrelated to legitimate penological
interests).
63. Id. at 87-90 (ruling that a lesser standard than strict scrutiny is appropriate
when determining the constitutionality of prison rules).
64. Id. at 87 (explaining that the test for reasonableness of prison regulations must
be flexible enough for prison officials to anticipate security problems and adopt
creative solutions).
65. Id. at 89.
66. Id. at 89-90.
67. Id. at 90.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See id. at 91.
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Court upheld this regulation finding that “[t]he prohibition on
correspondence between institutions is logically connected to these
legitimate security concerns.”71 The marriage regulation prohibited
prisoners from marrying unless they received approval from the prison
superintendent and required that the superintendent have a compelling
reason for permitting the marriage.72 The right to marry was further limited
because “generally only pregnancy or birth of a child [was] considered a
‘compelling reason’ to approve a marriage.”73 Despite the state’s claim
that the regulation was supported by security concerns, the court found that
the marriage regulation “represents an exaggerated response to such
security objectives.”74 The Court also explained that “[t]here are obvious,
easy alternatives to the Missouri regulation that accommodate the right to
marry while imposing a de minimus burden on the pursuit of security
objectives.”75
The Court’s holding in Turner is important on several fronts. First, it
lays out the reasonableness test by which prison regulations are to be
examined.76 Second, it provides two examples of the application of the
test, one in which the regulation was upheld, and one in which the
regulation was found unconstitutional.77 The shackling of pregnant women
during childbirth is both a common prison practice and an expressly
permitted practice, which courts should analyze in the same manner as any
other prison policy under Turner.
Turner recognizes that “[p]rison walls do not form a barrier separating
prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution.”78 In order to
protect the constitutional rights of pregnant prisoners, courts must examine
whether this policy is “‘reasonably related’ to legitimate penological
objectives, or whether it represents an ‘exaggerated response’ to those
concerns.”79 In this case, prison authorities will likely argue that pregnant
prisoners are shackled during childbirth to serve the penological goals of
eliminating security and flight risks.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
See id. at 96.
Id. at 96-97.
Id. at 97-98 (holding that incarceration does not negate the emotional support,
public commitment, and spiritual significance of marriage; therefore, such prohibitions
on inmate marriages impinge on important social and constitutional rights of both
inmates and civilians who wish to marry each other).
75. Id. at 98.
76. See id. at 89-91 (holding that regulations must have a valid government
interest, provide alternative means of expressing rights for inmates, avoid reallocation
of prison resources, and not have ready alternatives).
77. See id. at 81.
78. Id. at 84.
79. Id. at 87.
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The policy of shackling pregnant inmates during childbirth likely fails
the first factor of the Turner test, that there be a “‘valid, rational
connection’ between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental
interest put forward to justify it.”80 Although security and prevention of
escape are legitimate governmental interests, it is illogical for any state to
have genuine concerns that a woman in active labor poses a security risk or
that such a woman would attempt to escape. Even if a woman in active
labor did attempt to escape, it seems unlikely that she could get very far.
Furthermore, women in active labor, experiencing severe labor pains and
often highly medicated, will likely be unable to truly disrupt security in the
hospital. As for security concerns, women are much less likely than their
male counterparts to be convicted of violent crimes,81 and three out of four
females convicted of violent offenses were convicted of simple assault,82
demonstrating that even violent female offenders are not often convicted of
the more violent offenses including assault with a deadly weapon,
attempted murder, and murder.83 “[P]eople who have studied the issue
said, women are shackled because prison rules are unthinkingly exported to
a hospital setting.”84 The executive director of Amnesty, William F.
Schulz, explained that “[t]his is the perfect example of rule-following at the
expense of common sense . . . It’s almost as stupid as shackling someone in
a coma.”85 The facts that many fewer female offenders have been
convicted of violent offenses and that women in active labor rarely pose a
real security or flight risk, demonstrate that the policy of shackling
pregnant inmates during child birth “cannot be sustained [because] the
logical connection between the regulation and the asserted goal is so
remote as to render the policy . . . irrational.”86
Moreover, when compared to the regulation that prohibited inmate-toinmate mail, which was upheld to prevent any planning of violent acts or
escapes, the shackling of pregnant women during childbirth to ensure
security and prevent escape is illogical because “jails and prisons use
restraints on women as a matter of course, regardless of whether a woman
has a history of violence (which only a minority have); regardless of
whether she has ever absconded or attempted to escape (which few women
have) . . .” and regardless of whether a guard is present, which in many
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 89.
WOMEN IN PRISON, supra note 28.
GREENFELD & SNELL, supra note 26, at 1.
See id. (stating that seventy-five percent of violent crimes for which women
receive convictions are simple assault, while only half of the violent crimes for which
men receive convictions are for this offense).
84. Liptak, supra note 29, at A16.
85. Id.
86. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987).
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states is the case.87 If shackling was the exception to the rule, rather than
the normal practice, and shackles were permitted only when an inmate’s
individual history suggested that supervision would not suffice to eliminate
the security or escape risk, a logical connection between the penological
interests and the policy would more likely exist. However, in states where
no research is done into the individual inmate’s history of violent behavior
or escape attempts and shackling is applied as the standard practice, a
“‘rational connection’ between the prison regulation and the legitimate
governmental interest put forward to justify it” is lacking.88
However, even if departments of corrections are genuinely concerned
about security and escape, an “obvious, easy alternative[]” exists to protect
these concerns.89 The Court, in the fourth factor of the Turner
reasonableness test, explained “the existence of obvious, easy alternatives
may be evidence that the regulation is not reasonable, but is an
‘exaggerated response’ to prison concerns.”90 Rather than shackling
women to their hospital beds during childbirth, states could simply
supervise pregnant prisoners throughout their time away from the prison.
Similar to the Illinois ban on the use of restraints on inmates during
childbirth, states could require that a “correctional officer must be posted
immediately outside the delivery room.”91 Because “[t]wenty four state
departments of corrections [already] station an officer in the delivery room
while an inmate is in labor,”92 in at least these twenty-four states, no
additional costs would be incurred by creating a policy of supervising
pregnant inmates during childbirth, rather than shackling them.
Consequently, under the third reasonableness factor listed in Turner—“the
impact [that] accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have
on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources
generally”93—there will not likely be a large enough impact to justify the
continued shackling of pregnant inmates during childbirth.
Finally, the second factor of the Turner test, “whether there are
alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison
inmates,”94 also favors a finding that the common practice of shackling
87. See Amnesty Int’l, Not Part of My Sentence, supra note 6; see also BANKS,
supra note 15, at 87.
88. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
89. See id. at 98 (explaining that prisons do not have to use the “least restrictive
alternative” test if an alternative solution accommodates the prisoner’s rights at a
minimal cost to valid penological interests).
90. Id.
91. See 55 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-15003.6 (2000).
92. Amnesty Int’l, Abuse of Women in Custody, supra note 4.
93. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90.
94. Id.
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pregnant inmates during childbirth is unconstitutional. Because women
have no “means of exercising” their right to give birth while in prison other
than within the confines of prison policy, women will be unable to give
birth without the use of shackles unless this policy is explicitly abolished.
The existence of the obvious and simple alternative of supervising
pregnant inmates during childbirth, which many states are already doing,
and the lack of a logical connection between the goals of security and
prevention of escape and the policy permitting the shackling of pregnant
inmates during childbirth, demonstrate that this common practice and
prison policy is likely unconstitutional.95 State departments of corrections,
state legislators, and the federal prison system should follow the example
set by California, Illinois, and New York and enact and implement state
regulations and legislation to protect pregnant inmates who give birth while
incarcerated, thus bringing the country in line with its constitutional
obligations.96
II. Human Rights Law is Persuasive Authority
International human rights law is not binding on American courts;
however, it indicates international consensus as to the basic human rights
that court should recognize and enforce worldwide.97 The U.S. Supreme
Court has begun to acknowledge the importance of such international
consensus by referring to and relying on international human rights law in
two very recent and important Supreme Court cases.98 First, in 2003, the
Supreme Court decided Lawrence v. Texas, a case in which the Court
struck down a Texas statute criminalizing sexual activity between members
of the same sex.99 The Court cited the European Court of Human Rights,
the enforcement body for the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“European Convention”), to
95. Compare Turner, 482 U.S. at 90 (holding that prison regulations may amount
to a constitutional violation if there are easy alternatives indicating that the current
regulation may be unreasonable), with Amnesty Int’l, Not Part of My Sentence, supra
note 6 (presenting clear alternatives for the amendment of policies regarding state use
of restraints during child birth that infringe less upon the civil rights of pregnant
prisoners).
96. See Amnesty Int’l, Abuse of Women in Custody, supra note 4.
97. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 576 (2005) (determining the level
of punishment for juveniles that results in a violation of the Eighth Amendment by
considering in part what other countries have found to be disproportionate
punishment); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (using European laws as
guidance in finding that one’s decision to engage in consensual homosexual acts should
be a protected liberty interest).
98. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 576; Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577.
99. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79 (finding that the state failed to present a
legitimate state interest for enforcing anti-sodomy laws, and that such enforcement had
violated the Due Process Clause of the Constitution).
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demonstrate that a similar decision had been made regarding a Northern
Ireland law that forbade consensual homosexual conduct.100 The Court
explained that many countries recognize the rights asserted by the plaintiff
in Lawrence as an “integral part of human freedom.”101 The U.S. Supreme
Court relied in part on this international consensus as support for the
proposition that a prior case that upheld a statute similar to the Texas
statute at issue should be overruled.102
Even more recently, in Roper v. Simmons, decided in March of 2005, the
U.S. Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishment “forbid[s] the imposition of the death penalty on
offenders who were under the age of [eighteen] when their crimes were
committed.”103 In Roper, the Court affirmed the Missouri Supreme Court’s
holding which set aside the death sentence imposed on the defendant who
was under eighteen at the time he committed the crime.104 The Court
explained that in order to determine whether the Eighth Amendment barred
the juvenile death penalty, the court must conduct “a review of the
objective indicia of consensus” as well as “determine, in the exercise of our
own independent judgment, whether the death penalty is a disproportionate
punishment for juveniles.”105 The Court confirmed its own conclusion that
the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for offenders under the
age of eighteen by relying on international consensus that the imposition of
the death penalty on juveniles is a violation of their human rights.106 The
Court noticed that the “United States is the only country in the world that
continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death penalty”107 and that
the “Convention on the Rights of the Child, which every country in the
world has ratified save for the United States and Somalia, contains an
express prohibition on capital punishment for crimes committed by
juveniles under [eighteen].”108 Finally, the court explained that “[t]he
opinion of the world community, while not controlling our outcome, does
provide respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions . . .
100. See id. at 573 (providing an example of the value of foreign laws in deciding
American civil liberties through Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H. R. (1981),
which held that anti-sodomy laws were invalid under the European Convention on
Human Rights).
101. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577.
102. See id. at 576-77 (showing the trend in several nations against affirming antisodomy laws, which eventually contributed to the decision to overrule Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
103. 543 U.S. at 578.
104. Id. at 578-79.
105. Id. at 564.
106. Id. at 578.
107. Id. at 575.
108. Id. at 576.
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[T]he express affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other nations
and peoples simply underscores the centrality of those same rights within
our own heritage of freedom.”109
These examples demonstrate that in recent years the U.S. Supreme Court
has opened the door for international human rights and international
consensus to be used as persuasive authority. In Roper, the Court went so
far as to rely on the Convention on the Rights of the Child, a convention
not even ratified by the United States.110 Additionally, in Lawrence, the
Court referred to the European Convention, a treaty ratified by only
European countries.111 Through its Roper and Lawrence opinions, the
Supreme Court has opened the door for the use of international human
rights law in American courts. Because reliance on international human
rights treaties provides greater human rights protections, the Court should
continue to refer to international human rights law and global consensus as
a persuasive authority and as an indicator of how American law should
function.
III. Shackling Violates International Human Rights
The placement of restraints on incarcerated women while in labor
violates an assortment of international human rights guaranteed to women.
First, human rights law provides broad protections to pregnant women,
which U.S. federal and state prisons routinely violate by shackling and
chaining pregnant prisoners during childbirth. Additionally, international
human rights law provides for broad guarantees to the “highest attainable
standard of physical and mental health,”112 security of person, dignity, and
freedom from cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment, all of which are
violated by the habitual practice of chaining and shackling pregnant women
during labor.
A. Broad Protections for Pregnancy and Maternity
The placement of restraints on incarcerated women while in labor
contravenes the broad protections afforded to pregnant and birthing women
under international law.113 International human rights law protects
109. Id. at 578.
110. See id. at 576 (developing the Court’s holding that imposition of the death

penalty upon juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment based on non-binding foreign
authority).
111. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) (referencing laws in
Northern Ireland with no binding effect in the United States that were used to reject
laws forbidding homosexual conduct).
112. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 12(1),
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M 360 [hereinafter ICESCR].
113. See, e.g., CEDAW, supra note 3, ¶ 27 (reflecting a trend in international law of
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pregnant prisoners by requiring “adequate delivery assistance,”114 “safe
motherhood,”115 and “special care and assistance.”116 The common U.S.
prison practice of shackling pregnant inmates during childbirth constitutes
a breach of international mandates for broad protections of pregnant and
birthing mothers.
As early as 1948, the international community has emphasized the
importance of providing protections to women throughout pregnancy and
childbirth.117 First, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”),
proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, states that
“[m]otherhood . . . [is] entitled to special care and assistance.”118 Likewise,
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(“ICESCR”), to which the United States became a signatory in 1977,119
requires that “[s]pecial protection should be accorded to mothers during a
reasonable period before and after childbirth.”120 Similarly, the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (“American Declaration”)
states, “[a]ll women, during pregnancy and the nursing period . . . have the
right to special protection, care, and aid.”121 The Additional Protocol to the
American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights (“Additional Protocol to the American Convention”)
mirrors the emphasis on the special care that should be afforded to women
during pregnancy and childbirth.122 Similarly, the Convention on the
ensuring women’s rights to safe motherhood and emergency obstetric services);
International Conference on Population and Development, Cairo, Egypt, Sept. 5-13,
1994, Report of the ICPD, ¶ 8.22, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.171/13 (Oct. 18, 1994),
available at http://www.un.org/popin/icpd/conference/ offeng/ poa.html [hereinafter
Report of the ICPD] (urging the broad expansion of maternity health care, including
educational programs on safe motherhood and nutrition, prenatal care, delivery and
referral services, post-natal care, and family planning services).
114. Report of the ICPD, supra note 113, ¶ 8.22.
115. CEDAW, supra note 3, ¶ 27.
116. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), art. 25(2), U.N.
Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.html
[hereinafter UDHR].
117. Id.
118. Id. art. 25(2).
119. Ratifications to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360, available at http://www.ohchr.
org/english/countries/ ratification/3.htm [hereinafter Ratifications to ICESCR].
120. ICESCR, supra note 112, art. 10(2).
121. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, art.
VII (May 2, 1948), reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the
Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 17 (1992), available at
http://www.umn.edu/humanrts/oasinstr/zoas2dec.htm
[hereinafter
American
Declaration].
122. See Organization of American States, Additional Protocol to the American
Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
“Protocol of San Salvador,” art. 15(3), Nov. 17, 1988, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter Additional Protocol to the American Convention]
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Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (“CEDAW”),
to which the United States became a signatory in 1980,123 requires that
“States Parties shall ensure women appropriate services in connection with
pregnancy, confinement and the post-natal period.”124 The importance of
providing women with adequate care throughout pregnancy and childbirth
is repeated emphatically throughout international human rights law.
Furthermore, international human rights law specifies that states parties
should provide services to ensure that women “go safely through
pregnancy and childbirth.”125 The Programme of Action of the United
Nations: Reproductive Rights and Reproductive Health requires states to
provide “the right of access to appropriate health-care services that will
enable women to go safely through pregnancy and childbirth. . . .”126
Furthermore, this Programme of Action also demands that states provide
“adequate delivery assistance . . . [that] provides for obstetric
emergencies.”127 The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (“African Women’s
Protocol”) goes even further in its mandates upon States parties.128 It
requires that “States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to . . .
establish and strengthen existing pre-natal, delivery and post-natal health
and nutritional services for women during pregnancy and while they are
breastfeeding.”129 The African Women’s Protocol puts an affirmative duty
on its signatories to provide women with adequate care during
pregnancy.130 Even the Convention on the Rights of the Child provides
(instructing “States Parties . . . . To provide special care and assistance to mothers
during a reasonable period before and after childbirth”).
123. Ratifications to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, available at http://
www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/ cedaw/states.htm.
124. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
art. 12(2), Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
125. Report of the ICPD, supra note 113, ¶ 7.2; see Fourth World Conference on
Women, Beijing, China, Sept. 15, 1995, Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action,
ch. IV, ¶ 96, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20 (Sept. 1995) [hereinafter Beijing
Declaration].
126. Report of the ICPD, supra note 113, ¶ 7.2; see Beijing Declaration, supra note
125, ch. IV, ¶ 96.
127. Report of the ICPD, supra note 113, ¶ 8.22.
128. See Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the
Rights of Women in Africa, O.A.U. CAB/LEG/66.6, art. 14(2) (Sept. 13, 2000)
[hereinafter African Women’s Protocol] (outlining women’s health and reproductive
rights that compel State Parties to provide (1) access to adequate and affordable
healthcare and educational services; (2) health and nutritional services throughout
pregnancy; and (3) protection of reproductive rights by allowing abortions in extreme
circumstances, such as rape, incest, and where there health concerns for the mother or
fetus).
129. Id. art. 14(2)(b).
130. See id. (holding States Parties responsible for the establishment and support of

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2008

19

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 1

242

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 16:2

protection for pregnant mothers; it requires that “States Parties . . . shall
take appropriate measures . . . [t]o ensure appropriate pre-natal and postnatal health care for mothers.”131
Under international human rights law, these broad protections for
pregnant women extend to those incarcerated by the state. The United
Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners requires
that “[i]n women’s institutions there shall be special accommodation for all
necessary pre-natal and post-natal care and treatment.”132 International
human rights law consistently mandates that countries provide adequate
protections for women throughout pregnancy and childbirth, whether or not
they are incarcerated.
Not only do international human rights declarations and conventions
mandate special protections for pregnant and birthing women, but the
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
(“CEDAW Committee”), the enforcement body for CEDAW, has
elaborated on this duty in its General Recommendation on Women and
Health, a document created to guide State party actions. The CEDAW
Committee affirmed “it is the duty of States parties to ensure women’s
right to safe motherhood and emergency obstetric services.”133 Similarly,
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“Committee to
the ICESCR”), the enforcement body for the ICESCR, expanded on the
ICESCR’s provision of the right to the “highest attainable standard of
health” in a General Comment in 2000.134 The Committee to the ICESCR
specified that “[t]he right to maternal, child and reproductive health . . .
requir[es] measures to improve . . . maternal health . . . including access to
family planning, pre- and post-natal care, [and] emergency obstetric
services.”135 “The Committee [to the ICESCR] also confirm[ed] that the
following are obligations . . . (a) To ensure reproductive, maternal (prepregnancy services to women at the pre-natal, delivery, post-natal, and breast-feeding
stages).
131. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 24(2)(d), Nov. 20,
1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
132. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/1
Annex 1, E.S.C. res. 663C, art. 23 (1), U.N. ESCOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N.
Doc. E/3048 at 11 (July 31, 1957), amended by E.S.C. Res. 2076, U.N. ESCOR, 62
Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. E/5983, at 35 (May 13, 1977) [hereinafter Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners].
133. CEDAW, supra note 3.
134. See U.N. Comm. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Econ., Soc. &
Cultural Rights., Gen. Comment 14, Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation
of the Int’l Covenant of Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, ¶ 8-9 U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/2000/4 Aug. 11, 2000 [hereinafter ECOSOC, Substantive Issues] (stating that
the “highest attainable standard of health” includes an acknowledgement of one’s
freedoms and entitlements, as well as the facilities, goods, services, and conditions
needed to recognize these rights).
135. Id. ¶ 14.
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natal as well as post-natal) . . . health care.”136 From the very first
international human rights documents, such as the UDHR which was
created in 1948, to the most recent, such as the African Women’s Protocol,
which went into effect in November of 2005, the international community
has consistently required broad protections for pregnant women before,
during, and after childbirth, whether incarcerated or not.137
Most prisons in the United States continue to permit incarcerated women
to be shackled or chained to the hospital bed, often by their ankles, during
childbirth and even delivery.138 By allowing this treatment of pregnant
prisoners, U.S. prisons routinely violate the basic and fundamental rights of
women to “adequate delivery assistance,”139 “safe motherhood,”140 and
“special care and assistance”141 as required by numerous international
human rights documents. The common practice of shackling pregnant
inmates during childbirth in U.S. prisons constitutes a breach of
international mandates for broad protections of pregnant and birthing
mothers.
B. Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health
Similar to the broad protections required for pregnant women,
international human rights law also continually requires state parties to
provide for the “highest attainable standard of . . . health”142 for their
citizens. Because international human rights law expressly extended this
broad right to health to prisoners,143 U.S. prisons commonly violate
136. Id. ¶ 44.
137. See UDHR, supra note 116, art. 25 (recognizing that those in motherhood have

rights to necessary social services, special care, and assistance); African Women’s
Protocol, supra note 128, art. 14(2)(b) (holding States Parties responsible for
establishing pre-natal, delivery, post-natal services).
138. See Ellen M. Barry, Bad Medicine: Health Care Inadequacies in Women’s
Prisons, 16 CRIM. JUST. 39, 40 (2001) (“Pregnant women in county jails and in the
state prison system are routinely transported to and from facilities and hospitals in
restraints. Women in all stages of labor, including during delivery, are routinely
shackled by the ankle to their hospital beds”); see also Ehrlich & Paltrow, supra note 1
(“Prisons throughout the United States restrain and shackle women throughout
pregnancy and during labor.”).
139. Report of the ICPD, supra note 113, ¶ 8.22 (specifying that adequate delivery
assistance entails services for obstetric emergencies and avoids heavy reliance on Csections).
140. CEDAW, supra note 3, ¶ 27 (noting that States should allocate the maximum
available resources to services dealing with childbirth and women’s reproductive
health).
141. UDHR, supra note 116, art. 25(2).
142. ICESCR, supra note 113, art. 12(1) (including both physical and mental
health).
143. See Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners, G.A. Res. 45/111, Annex,
45 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49A) at 200, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (1990), princ. 9, available
at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/g2bpt.htm [hereinafter Basic Principles for
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women’s right to health by shackling incarcerated women during labor and
delivery. In fact, prison authorities interfere with the proper medical and
health attention that inmates in labor would otherwise receive by requiring
that these patients remain shackled to their hospital bed.144 Because the
effects of shackling on the health of both the mother and the baby can be
profound, particularly in a situation where an emergency C-section is
required, the violations of the mother’s right to the “highest attainable
standard of health” are evident.145 In order to abide by international norms
and mandates, U.S. prisons should eliminate the common practice of
shackling pregnant inmates during childbirth.
Several international human rights documents recognize and stress the
right to health. The ICESCR, which was signed by the United States in
1977,146 requires that “States Parties . . . recognize the right of everyone to
the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental
health.”147 The UDHR similarly mandates that “[e]veryone has the right
to . . . health and well-being . . . and medical care.”148 CEDAW requires
States parties to “ensure . . . access to health-care services, including those
related to family planning.”149 The Additional Protocol to the American
Convention provides that “[e]veryone shall have the right to health,
understood to mean the enjoyment of the highest level of physical, mental,
and social well-being.”150 This right to health is reiterated in the American
Declaration,151 the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action,152 the
the Treatment of Prisoners] (mandating that prisoners’ legal status shall not affect their
rights to obtain health services available in their home countries).
144. See, e.g., Amnesty Int’l, Not Part of My Sentence, supra note 6 (describing one
inmate’s experience of giving birth while shackled, where she was not permitted to
move around her room to induce labor and where the shackles were not removed until
she was in active labor and was unable to place her legs and feet into the proper
position necessary during childbirth).
145. See id. (citing a physician’s concerns that shackling women during labor
endangers the health of the mother and the fetus because it compromises the woman’s
ability to adjust her body during labor and delays emergency responses to any
unexpected complications that may arise during childbirth).
146. See Ratifications to ICESCR, supra note 119.
147. ICESCR, supra note 112, art. 12 (enumerating specific provisions necessary to
achieve the highest attainable standard of health, including those aimed at reduction of
infant mortality and promotion of healthy child development).
148. UDHR, supra note 116, art. 25(1) (stating that medical care, among other
things, is necessary to achieve an adequate standard of living).
149. CEDAW, supra note 3, ¶ 8 (urging that access to health services on an equal
basis to men and women will aid to eliminate discrimination against women in health
care).
150. Additional Protocol to the American Convention, supra note 122, art. 10.
151. See American Declaration, supra note 121, art. XI (including access to medical
care as one way of exercising one’s right to the preservation of heath and well-being).
152. See World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna
Declaration and Programme of Action, ¶ 31, U.N. Doc A/CONF.157/23 (July 12,
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Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action: Human Rights of Women,153
and the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action: Women and Health.154
International human rights law is emphatic and consistent in its guarantees
of a fundamental right to health.
Both the CEDAW Committee and the Committee to the ICESCR have
made further statements elucidating each convention’s guarantees of a right
to health as a basic and fundamental human right.155 The CEDAW
Committee explained that it “affirm[s] that access to health care, including
reproductive health, is a basic right under the [CEDAW] Convention . . .
.”156 Furthermore, the CEDAW Committee instructed that “States parties
should also . . . [m]onitor the provision of health services to women . . .
[and r]equire all health services to be consistent with the human rights of
women.”157 The Committee to the ICESCR similarly affirmed that
“[h]ealth is a fundamental right indispensable for the exercise of other
human rights,”158 and that health care and services be available, accessible,
acceptable, and of good quality.159 The Committee to the ICESCR
additionally proclaimed that “[i]t is also important to undertake preventive,
promotive and remedial action to shield women from the impact of
harmful . . . practices and norms that deny them their full reproductive
rights.”160 The committees to CEDAW and the ICESCR, conventions that
have been signed by the United States, require that signatories provide for
an extensive right to health for their citizen populations.161

1993), available at http://ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/vienna.pdf (prohibiting the creation
of any obstacles that interfere with the right to medical care).
153. See Beijing Declaration, supra note 125, ch. IV ¶ 223 (reaffirming an
individual’s right to achieve the highest standard of sexual and reproductive health).
154. See id. ¶ 91 (emphasizing that women’s right to enjoy the highest achievable
standard of health is essential to ensure their full participation in all aspects of society).
155. See ECOSOC, Substantive Issues, supra note 134, ¶ 3 (discussing the right to
health and its interdependency on other basic human rights, such as the right to
housing, human dignity and non-discrimination); CEDAW, supra note 3, ¶ 2 (agreeing
that providing accessible health care services throughout women’s life cycles is
essential to ensure their well-being).
156. CEDAW, supra note 3, ¶ 1.
157. Id. ¶ 31(d)-(e).
158. ECOSOC, Substantive Issues, supra note 134, ¶ 1.
159. See id. ¶ 12 (requiring that health services, goods, and facilities be accessible
and available to all citizens without discrimination, especially vulnerable and
marginalized members of society).
160. See id. ¶ 21.
161. See id. ¶ 11 (specifying that the right to health includes citizen-participation in
health-related decision-making and the availability of factors that affect health, such as
water, nutritious food, and healthy environment conditions); CEDAW, supra note 3,
¶ 12 (emphasizing that states must consider biological, socio-economic, and
psychological factors that distinguish women from men when addressing health care
issues that affect women).
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The African Charter and the African Women’s Protocol follow suit and
guarantee an international right to health.162 However, these documents go
even further in protecting this right. The African Charter proclaims that “1.
Every individual shall have the right to enjoy the best attainable state of
physical and mental health. 2. States Parties to the present Charter shall
take the necessary measures to protect the health of their people and to
ensure that they receive medical attention. . . .”163 The African Women’s
Protocol requires that “States Parties shall ensure the right to health of
women . . . .”164 The African Women’s Protocol also mandates that “States
Parties shall . . . enact and effectively implement appropriate legislative or
regulatory measures, including those prohibiting and curbing all . . .
harmful practices which endanger the health and general well-being of
women,”165 and that “States Parties shall prohibit and condemn all forms of
harmful practices which negatively affect the human rights of women and
which are contrary to recognized international standards.”166 The repetition
of the right to health in such a wide range of international rights documents
demonstrates international consensus on the importance of the right to
health.
This broad right to health has been expressly extended to incarcerated
citizens. The United Nations Basic Principles for the Treatment of
Prisoners requires that “[p]risoners shall have access to the health services
available in the country without discrimination on the grounds of their legal
situation.”167 The United Nations General Assembly explained that
“[h]ealth personnel, particularly physicians, charged with the medical care
of prisoners and detainees have a duty to provide them with protection of
their physical and mental health and treatment . . . of the same quality and
162. See African Women’s Protocol, supra note 128, art. 2(1)(b), (e) (qualifying any
practice that harms the health of women as discriminatory and requiring that states
should support continental policies that aim to eliminate those practices); African
[Banjul] Charter on Human and People’s Rights, arts. 2, 16, Oct. 21, 1986, 21 I.L.M.
58 [hereinafter African Charter] (asserting that all people shall enjoy the rights listed in
the charter, which includes the right to health, without being subjected to
discrimination on the basis of race, ethnic group, national origin, and birth, among
other things).
163. African Charter, supra note 162, art. 16.
164. African Women’s Protocol, supra note 128, art. 14(1).
165. Id. art. 2(1)(b).
166. Id. art. 5.
167. Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners, supra note 143, princ. 9; see
Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or
Imprisonment, G.A. Res. 43/173, Annex, 43 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 298, U.N.
Doc. A/43/49 (1988), princ. 24, available at http://www.umn.edu/humanrts/instree
/g3bpppdi.htm (requiring that all prisoners be offered prompt medical attention when
needed, free of charge); Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, supra note 132, R. 25(1)
(mandating that medical personnel should care for prisoners’ physical and mental needs
and insisting that sick prisoners are entitled to daily visits from the medical staff).
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standard as is afforded to those who are not imprisoned or detained.”168
The Committee to the ICESCR and the Human Rights Committee, the
enforcement body to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (“ICCPR”), a convention which the United States ratified in 1992,169
both stress that prisoners are entitled to equal access to medical and health
services.170 The broad right to health established by international law and
the statements of convention enforcement bodies extends to all people,
including prisoners. Accordingly, prisoners are entitled to the “health
services available in the country without discrimination on the grounds of
their legal situation.”171
In 1998, the Human Rights Committee, in Henry v. Jamaica, ruled that
article 10 of the ICCPR, which states “[a]ll persons deprived of their liberty
shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of
the human person,”172 includes a right to medical attention and treatment
while incarcerated.173 Nicholas Henry was convicted for the murder of
three policemen in Jamaica and sentenced to death.174 Henry informed
168. Principles of Medical Ethics relevant to the Role of Health Personnel,
Particularly Physicians, in the Protection of Prisoners and Detainees Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 37/194,
Annex, princ. 1, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51,U.N. Doc. A/37/51 (Dec. 18,
1982), available at http://www1.umn.edu/ humanrts/instree/h3pmerhp.htm.
169. See Ratifications to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S 171, 6 I.L.M. 368, available at http://www.ohchr.org/
english/countries/ratification/4.htm [hereinafter Ratifications to ICCPR].
170. See ECOSOC, Substantive Issues, supra note 134, ¶ 34 (prohibiting
discriminatory health practices and disallowing coercive medical treatments of states’
citizens, including prisoners); U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment 20,
Article 7, Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted
by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, ¶11, U.N. Doc. HR1\Gen\1\Rev.1 at 30 (1994),
available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/gencomm/ hrcom20.htm [hereinafter U.N.
Human Rights Comm., General Comment 20 Article 7] (identifying prisoners as
vulnerable members of the society who are in need of protective safeguards, such as
prompt access to medical personnel).
171. Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners, supra note 143, princ. 9; see
also G.A. Res. 43/173, supra note 167, princ. 26 (ensuring that prisoners shall have
access to written records of their medical examinations); Rules for the Treatment of
Prisoners, supra note 132, R.22 (requiring that prisons provide its population with
medical staff with specialized knowledge, especially psychiatry and dentistry, and
guaranteeing the right to transfer to facilities providing any specialized treatment
necessary for prisoners).
172. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 10(1), Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 [hereinafter ICCPR].
173. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Henry v. Jamaica, ¶ 7.3, Comm. No.
610/1995, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/64/D/610/1995 (Oct. 21, 1998), available at http://
www.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/session64/view610.htm (holding that Jamaica’s failure
to provide adequate medical examination to its prisoner violated article 10 of the
ICCPR).
174. See id. ¶¶ 2.1-2.2 (stating that Henry was accused and convicted, of being an
accessory to the murders because he helped in making the weapons used during the
attack on the Olympic Police Station, was aware of the attack, allowed those directly
involved in the murder to congregate in his house, and participated in hiding weapons
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prison authorities of a medical condition he was suffering from, and despite
various requests, the authorities failed to take him to the hospital.175 After
approximately three years, Henry finally saw a doctor, who informed him
that surgery was necessary.176 Despite the doctor’s instructions and several
attempts by Henry and his representatives, he was never hospitalized and
never received medical treatment for his condition.177 The Human Rights
Committee considered Henry’s allegations and found that “the lack of
medical treatment is in violation of article 10 of the Covenant,”178 and
declared that “[t]he State party is under an obligation to take measures that
similar violations not occur.”179 Even under the ICCPR, which does not
contain a broad right to health, the Human Rights Committee recognized
the importance of the right to health by requiring that incarcerated citizens
be provided with “medical examination and treatment,” like any other
citizen.180 Although American prisons are not denying medical treatment
in the exact same manner as the Jamaican prison in Henry, the common
practice of shackling inmates during childbirth can lead to the denial of
medical treatment because it inhibits the doctor’s ability to deliver the baby
in the safest manner, and it can create and aggravate physical
complications.
By shackling incarcerated women during labor and delivery, U.S.
prisons are violating women’s rights to the “highest attainable standard of
health.” The U.S. prison system is not following the United Nations
mandate that “[p]risoners shall have access to the health services available
in the country without discrimination on the grounds of their legal
status.”181 Female prisoners are subjected to harsh treatment during
childbirth, rather than receiving the “highest attainable standard of health”
that other female patients receive.182 In fact, prison authorities are
interfering with the proper medical and health attention that birthing
after the attack).
175. See id. ¶ 3.2 (claiming that Henry had experienced testicular problems since
1988).
176. See id. (charging that in 1992, Henry was allowed to see a doctor who
scheduled his surgery for April 1992).
177. See id. ¶¶ 3.2-3.3 (claiming that not only was Henry denied a necessary
surgery, he was assaulted, in 1993, with a metal detector on his testicles, and received
no medical treatment for those injuries).
178. Id. ¶ 7.3.
179. Id. ¶ 9.
180. See id. (ruling that an effective remedy to the violation of the ICCPR’s
guarantee of humane and dignified treatment of prisoners is immediate medical
examination).
181. Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners, supra note 143, princ. 9.
182. See, e.g., Ehrlich & Paltrow, supra note 1 (noting that shackles may increase
the risk of injury during childbirth and may impede necessary emergency responses).
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prisoners would otherwise receive from their obstetricians.
Finally, the effects of shackling on the health of both the mother and the
baby could be profound in an emergency situation. For example, if an
emergency cesarean were necessary, even a few minutes delay in removing
the shackles, causing a lack of oxygen to the baby, could lead to permanent
brain damage.183 Similarly, “[h]aving the woman in shackles compromises
the ability to manipulate her legs into the proper position for treatment.”184
In order to abide by international norms, U.S. prisons should eliminate the
practice of shackling pregnant inmates during childbirth.
C. Right to Integrity and Security of Person
The shackling of pregnant inmates during labor and delivery violates the
right to security of person which is guaranteed in international human
rights law. Because prisons interfere with the treatment that incarcerated
women receive while in labor, by physically restricting their movement and
creating a more painful and stressful experience, prisons violate the right to
integrity and security of person as consistently guaranteed by international
human rights law.
Various international human rights conventions and declarations affirm
this right. The UDHR and the ICCPR, which the United States ratified in
1992,185 mandate that “[e]veryone has the right to . . . security of
person.”186 Furthermore, both the American Convention on Human Rights
(“American Convention”),187 to which the United States became a
signatory in 1977,188 and the American Declaration189 uphold the right to
security of person. The American Convention additionally requires that
“[e]very person has the right to have his physical, mental, and moral
integrity respected.”190 The African Charter states that “[e]very human
being shall be entitled to respect for . . . the integrity of his person,”191 and
that “[e]very individual shall have the right to . . . the security of his

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

See Amnesty Int’l, Abuse of Women in Custody, supra note 4.
Id.; see also Ehrlich & Paltrow, supra note 1.
Ratifications to ICCPR, supra note 169.
UDHR, supra note 116, art. 3; ICCPR, supra note 172, art. 9.
Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights,
Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter Convention on Human Rights].
188. Organization of American States, Ratifications to American Convention on
Human Rights “Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica,” Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 361,
available
at
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Sigs/b-32.html
[hereinafter
Ratifications to the American Convention].
189. American Declaration, supra note 121, art. I (declaring that “Every human
being has the right to . . . the security of his person”).
190. Convention on Human Rights, supra note 187, art. 5.
191. African Charter, supra note 162, art. 4.
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person.”192 Finally, the African Women’s Protocol guarantees that “[e]very
woman shall be entitled to respect for . . . the integrity and security of her
person.”193 Interference with the medical attention received by imprisoned
women during labor, by requiring that women remain shackled to their
hospital bed, may have profound effects on the mother and baby’s health.
Rather than respecting women’s bodily integrity and security of person,
American prisons forcibly shackle women, restricting their movement and
aggravating the already painful and stressful situation of childbirth.194
D. Right to Dignity and Freedom from Cruel, Inhumane, and Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
In addition to the aforementioned rights, the international community has
mandated the protection of the right to freedom from cruel, inhumane, and
degrading treatment or punishment.195 Shackling inmates during childbirth
without regards to their individual history of escape attempts or violent
behavior is cruel, inhumane, and degrading. Childbirth is a difficult,
stressful, and painful experience.
Restricting women’s movement,
subjecting them to health risks, and treating them in a dehumanizing
manner violates women’s rights to be treated humanely and with dignity.
The experiences of women who have given birth under these conditions
speak for themselves. One inmate described her experience: “[i]magine
being shackled to a metal bedpost, excruciating pains going through my
body, and not being able to adjust myself to even try to feel any type of
comfort, trying to move and with each turn having hard, cold metal
restraining my movements.”196 In order to avoid violating the vast amount
of international law that requires prisons to treat inmates in a humane and
non-degrading manner, U.S. prisons should eliminate the common practice
of shackling female prisoners during childbirth.
The right to be treated with dignity and to be free from cruel, unusual or
degrading treatment is another right that is guaranteed repeatedly in an
assortment of human rights conventions.197 The UDHR, the ICCPR, and
the American Convention state that “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture
or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.”198 Although the United
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id. art. 6.
African Women’s Protocol, supra note 128, art. 4.
See Amnesty Int’l, Not Part of My Sentence, supra note 6.
See id.
Id.
See Amnesty Int’l, Abuse of Women in Custody, supra note 4.
ICCPR, supra note 172, art. 7; Convention on Human Rights, supra note 187,
art. 5(2); UDHR, supra note 116, art. 5; see U.N. Human Rights Comm., General
Comment 20 Article 7, supra note 170, ¶ 2 (stating that “[t]he aim of the provisions of
article 7 of the [ICCPR] is to protect both the dignity and the physical and mental
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States ratified the ICCPR,199 it reserved as to this provision because of the
Eighth Amendment’s similar prohibition on “cruel and unusual
punishments,”200 making it slightly more difficult to assert violations of
human rights in the context covered by the Eighth Amendment. In any
case, the ICCPR also requires that “[a]ll persons deprived of their liberty
shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of
the human person.”201 The American Convention, also signed by the
United States,202 mirrors this requirement of the ICCPR by stating that
“[a]ll persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with respect for the
inherent dignity of the human person.”203 The American Declaration
similarly proclaims that “[e]very individual who has been deprived of his
liberty . . . . has the right to humane treatment during the time he is in
custody,”204 and “not to receive cruel, infamous, or unusual punishment.”205
Both the African Charter206 and the African Women’s Protocol207 uphold
these rights for prisoners. International human rights law’s repeated
recognition of the right to be treated with dignity and to be free from
torture and inhumane and degrading treatment demonstrates its
international importance.
Furthermore, the United Nations has created several sets of principles to
ensure the humane treatment of prisoners.208 First, the Basic Principles for
the Treatment of Prisoners requires that “[a]ll prisoners shall be treated
integrity of the individual”).
199. See Ratifications to ICCPR, supra note 169.
200. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
201. ICCPR, supra note 172, art. 10; see U.N. Human Rights Comm., General
Comment 21, Article 10, Compilation of General Comments and General
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, ¶ 4 U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 33 (1994), available at http://www.umn.edu/humanrts/
gencomm/hrcom21.htm, [hereinafter U.N. Human Rights Committee, General
Comment 21, Article 10] (“Treating all persons deprived of their liberty with humanity
and with respect for their dignity is a fundamental and universally applicable rule.”).
202. Ratifications to American Convention, supra note 188.
203. Convention on Human Rights, supra note 187, art. 5(2).
204. American Declaration, supra note 121, art. XXV.
205. Id. art. XXVI.
206. See African Charter, supra note 162, art. 5 (“Every individual shall have the
right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human being . . . . All forms of
exploitation and degradation of man particularly . . . torture, cruel, inhuman or
degrading punishment and treatment shall be prohibited.”).
207. See African Women’s Protocol, supra note 128, art. 3(1) (determining that
“[e]very woman shall have the right to dignity inherent in a human being and to the
recognition and protection of her human and legal rights”). In addition, “States
Parties . . . ensure the protection of every woman’s right to respect for her dignity.” Id.
art. 3(4). Furthermore, “[a]ll forms of exploitation, cruel, inhuman or degrading
punishment and treatment shall be prohibited.” Id. art. 4(1).
208. See generally Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners, supra note 143;
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, supra note 132.
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with the respect due to their inherent dignity and value as human
beings.”209 The Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under
Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, states that “[a]ll persons under
any form of detention or imprisonment shall be treated in a humane manner
and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person,”210 and that
“[n]o person under any form of detention or imprisonment shall be
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment. No circumstance whatever may be invoked as a justification
for torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.”211 The international community has repeatedly expressed its
agreement that prisoners should be treated humanely.
Furthermore, the international community has created laws on the use of
restraints on prisoners to ensure humane treatment. The United Nations
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (“United Nations
Standard Minimum Rules”) states
[i]nstruments of restraint, such as handcuffs, chains, irons and straitjacket, shall never be applied as a punishment. Furthermore, chains or
irons shall not be used as restraints. Other instruments of restraint shall
not be used except in the following circumstances:
(a) As a precaution against escape during a transfer, provided that they
shall be removed when the prisoner appears before a judicial or
administrative authority;
(b) On medical grounds by direction of the medical officer;
(c) By order of the director, if other methods of control fail, in order to
prevent a prisoner from injuring himself or others or from damaging
property; in such instances the director shall at once consult the medical
officer and report to the higher administrative authority.212

Under the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules, the only permitted
use of restraints on imprisoned women during childbirth would be those
that are “by order of the director” and those “by direction of the medical
officer,” because women in labor would not be in transfer as required by
part (a) above.213 According to the United Nations, the shackling of
pregnant women during labor should be the exception rather than the rule,
and it should only be done in the rare circumstances in which the director
or the medical officer believes such restraint is necessary.214
209. Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners, supra note 143, princ. 1.
210. Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of

Detention or Imprisonment, G.A. Res. 43/173, Annex, 43 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49)
at 298, U.N. Doc. A/43/49 (1988), princ.1, available at http://www.umn.edu/humanrts/
instree/g3bpppdi.htm.
211. Id. princ. 6.
212. Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, supra note 132, art. 33.
213. Id.
214. See id.
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Additionally, the U.S. prison system’s treatment of its pregnant inmates
violates the international convention dedicated solely to the elimination of
torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. The Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (“CAT”), which the United States ratified in 1994,215 requires
that “[e]ach State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative,
judicial, or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under
its jurisdiction.”216 CAT defines torture as
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person . . . for any reason based on
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or
at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public
official or other person acting in an official capacity.217

This broad definition could certainly include the treatment pregnant
inmates are subjected to during childbirth. First, women who have gone
through the experience of giving birth while shackled explain that the
shackling did increase the pain and stress of childbirth on both physical and
mental levels.218 Second, the shackling is done based simply on the
woman’s incarcerated status, regardless of the fact that she may pose little
or no security or flight risk.219 Third, the shackling is inflicted intentionally
because the woman is shackled at the direction of the guard or officer
escorting her to the hospital.220 Finally, the shackling is done at the
instruction of prison authorities acting in their official capacity.221
Consequently, CAT may bar this common prison practice.
Regardless, CAT also prohibits “other acts of cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture as
defined in article I, when such acts are committed by or at the instigation of
or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person
acting in an official capacity.”222 Even if the shackling of pregnant inmates
215. Ratifications to the U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85,
available at http://www.ohchr.org/ english/countries/ratification/9.htm.
216. U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, art. 2(1), Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter
Convention Against Torture].
217. Id. art. 1(1).
218. See Amnesty Int’l, Abuse of Women in Custody, supra note 4 (describing the
experience of Samantha Luther, who gave birth while her ankles were shackled to the
hospital bed and told Amnesty USA that “[i]t was so humiliating. My ankles were
raw.”).
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. See id.
222. Convention Against Torture, supra note 216, art. 16(1).
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during childbirth does not constitute torture under CAT, it likely constitutes
“degrading treatment or punishment” because the act of shackling pregnant
inmates during labor is done at the instigation of and with the consent of
the prison guard or officer acting in his or her official capacity. Therefore,
the common prison practice of shackling pregnant inmates to their hospital
bed during labor and delivery would violate CAT either under its definition
of torture, or its prohibition of other inhumane or degrading treatment, or
both.
The Committee Against Torture, the enforcement body to CAT, recently
informed the United States that the shackling of pregnant inmates during
childbirth is a violation of CAT’s prohibition of degrading or inhumane
treatment.223 The Committee Against Torture voiced concern about the
routine shackling of pregnant inmates during labor in its report to the
United States in July of 2006.224 In this report, the Committee Against
Torture explained to the United States that “[t]he Committee is concerned
at the treatment of detained women in the State party, including . . .
incidents of shackling women detainees during childbirth” (art. 16, which
prohibits degrading and inhumane acts that do not fit the definition of
torture in article 1).225 “The State party should adopt all appropriate
measures to ensure that women in detention are treated in conformity with
international standards.”226 Thus, in July of 2006, the Committee on
Torture explicitly and directly informed the United States that the common
practice of shackling pregnant inmates during childbirth is a violation of
CAT.227 The Committee instructed the United States to take measures to
ensure that female prisoners’ international human rights are upheld.
Regardless, the practice of shackling continues.228
The common prison practice of shackling women during childbirth
violates various internationally recognized human rights. In order to meet
its international obligations, American prisons should eliminate this
dehumanizing practice. The United States has been informed of the
Committee on Torture’s disapproval of the policy, and should abolish the
practice, bringing its prison systems in line with its international
obligations under various human rights treaties that the country has signed
and ratified.
223. See U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Conclusions and Recommendations of the
Committee Against Torture: United States of America, ¶ 33 UN Doc.
CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (July 25, 2006), available at http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/
4281593.html.
224. See id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. See id.
228. See Amnesty Int’l, Abuse of Women in Custody, supra note 4.
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CONCLUSION
The American prison system’s routine shackling of pregnant prisoners
during childbirth violates both the Eighth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution and vast amounts of international human rights law.
Incarcerated women have been denied their right to health as required
under the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment. Furthermore, international human rights law provides broad
protections for pregnant and birthing women and guarantees the rights to
the highest attainable standard of health, security of person, and freedom
from torture and inhumane or degrading treatment. The United States is
violating these internationally agreed upon rights of prisoners, and the
Committee on Torture has explicitly informed the country of its violations
of human rights. Because the U.S. Supreme Court has opened the door for
international human rights arguments, the country should look to
international human rights for an indication as to how American law should
protect its pregnant prisoners. U.S. federal and state prisons, departments
of corrections, and state legislatures should follow the example set by
California and Illinois and prohibit this inhumane and dehumanizing
treatment of its female prisoners, bringing the country in accordance with
both its constitutional and international obligations to its female prison
population.
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